[QUOTE]Then how come we haven't applied this same technique to the country with the real problem, Afghanistan? 9 troops slaughtered the other day. 15 more severely injured forcing a retreat from an outpost. There is little doubt that the violence is down a bit in Iraq. But it certainly isn't a vacation paradise and probably will never be one. Ultimately, at the end of the day one has to ask the question: "is there really a country under there or is it just a collection of tribes and families?" Our misplaced attention to Iraq has taken our eyes off of the real prize, Afghanistan (and the northern reaches of Pakistan), where we should have been focusing our efforts all along. Iraq was nothing more than a diversion....and it worked....we were diverted.
Posted by TP on a Regional Newspaper Forum[/QUOTE]
The only diversion from Afghanistan was the media and public perception. While the left kept attention focused on Iraq for the last 5 years, Troop Strength continously increased in Afghanistan: from approximately 11,000 to 50,000 (NATO & US 25,000 each).
Despite a lack of media coverage Our Troops continued to search out and destroy the enemy in a terrain and culture much different.
Violence is down "a bit!?!?!?" It's down 80% from a year ago and there are now fewer civilians killed by all violence (primarily actions of the enemy but also crime) than were killed during an average month BY Saddam's Regime. In other words, violence is lower than it has been in 30 years.
Violence is down SIGNIFICANTLY in Iraq, in all categories, including US KIA's, Iraqi Security Forces KIA's, political assassinations, and civilian murders.
And what does the media do? Compare the violence in Iraq, post surge, to the levels that have been fairly constant in Afghanistan.
Does the Success in Iraq mean we should re-assess the strategies in Afghanistan? Yes, the Military constantly re-assesses what is and is not working. And the most important development in this particular topic is that Petraeus was recently confirmed as the Commander of CentCom. This fall (he isn't working the new job yet), he'll become responsible for both, meaning he will be able to put a commander in place to do the same thing in Afghanistan.
But we also have to look at what could cause that to be difficult. Obviously the terrain: It can take an entire day to go 20 miles in Afghanistan.
There is also the fact that half the troops in Afghanistan are NATO and other Nationalities. Last year, a British General was running the show. This year an American is in charge. In the North, the Germans and Dutch have different mentalities, tactics and rotations than do the Americans, Canadians and Brits.
Whereas the ethnic strains in Iraq were the temporary results of Al-Qaeda/Saddam/Iranian backed Special Groups, the ethnic loyalties in Afghanistan run deep into their culture and history. Though Afghanistan is deeply tribal, and tribal is normally portrayed as negative, tribal society is not necessarily bad.
Some of the things that have brought Iraqi violence levels down to the Afghani violence levels can in fact be applied to both Nations to bring them even further down. But the success in bringing Iraqi Violence down to Afghani Violence levels must be viewed as a Success, NOT as a failure in Afghanistan.