I apologize for the delay on this. Yesterday was an eventful day:
I just can't get my head wrapped around the fact that after 7 years that there isn't more signs of progress. I was reading an article last night about the returning refugees from Pakistan. It stated that there were over 260,000 living in tent cities. In the middle of winter, many are literally freezing to death. Many had no food. So now my question is this, Why hasn't more been done to take care of those Afghans? ~Ky Woman (In comments here)
Well, I can't accuse you of not asking the tough questions. There is not a simple answer to these inquiries. I wish there were, just as do our Military Leaders. Part of the answer, that refugees and their ailments are a fact of war that seems impossible to overcome is in no way satisfying.
In a perfect world, combatants would not impact the lives of non-combatants, but in a perfect world there would be no war. Unfortunately, we don't live in a perfect world and it is unlikely that we will in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, there will likely always be the evil-doers, or psychotic if you prefer. The nature of humanity is that some will prey on others and that is best described by LTC Grossman and the adaptation in poetry by Russ Vaughn of his work which I reposted here earlier today.
As I have stated many times, the war in which we are currently embroiled is truly a war of good vs. evil. In recent history, there has been no other that pitted such atrocious enemies against Troops as honorable as our own. This is made clear in one of the most important articles I've posted on Afghanistan, yesterday. It is based on the findings of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission which is referenced and downloadable in the Article "Crimes Against Islam."
The cited report is long overdue. It catalogs the manners in which our
enemies attack and murder the innocent, terrorize common citizens, as well as teachers, doctors, and government officials. It provides Koranic verses, Hadiths, and Shari'a Law that condemns those actions, as well as demonstrating that the enemy is breaking Afghan and International Law. The former is important because to end the atrocities, we must drive a wedge between islamists and the recruiting base of illiterates they prey upon in order to prey upon those not engaged in atrocities.
Refugees exist because non-combatants desire to remove themselves from the potential of death to themselves and their families. They exist because combat can create negative economic conditions as well as direct threats to their lives. The enemy we face, as demonstrated in the cited report, attempt to excerbate that condition.
But refugee status itself can create even greater economic hardship. Refugees have removed themselves from their established homes, from hardened shelters, from their employment, and often from their extended family of support. The very nature of Refugee status creates hardship which may be of greater detriment than what they left.
Though, small numbers of refugees could be assisted and taken in by the destination citizenry, refugees rarely come in small numbers. When large numbers arrive, temporary housing must be set up and this is normally "tent cities." Security must then be established to protect them not only from external threats but also the potential of infiltration by combatants/recruiters and common criminals. Just as cities exhibit higher crime rates than rural areas, these refugee camps see higher crime rates but without the protections of hardened structures.
Fortunately, the well-intentioned but ill-conceived program used during Viet Nam has not been replicated. We have learned that the forcible movement of non-combatants from rural areas difficult to control to urban areas of greater control has more negatives than positives.
Other times in history, there has been an attempt to force civilians to remain in their homes. This is equally wrong, particularly in that it removes the rights of humans to make their own decisions and places them in harm's way against their will.
The answer then must be one which creates a desire in the non-combatants to avoid becoming Refugees. That is accomplished by their realization that they will not be harmed, which would necessitate abiding by the Geneva Conventions by both sides, or the security of their homes by the force in power. In the nature of this war and as a tactic of the enemy, the enemy does not abide by the Geneva Conventions and as a means to undermine the Government of Afghanistan actively terrorizes the citizenry to demonstrate the lack of security and the lack of authority of it.
While the apparent reaction to this, primarily when one can look at it from the outside in, is the simple resolution of those terrorized to take up arms against the atrocious, it is not as easy for the citizen who is faced with the situation. Many civilians on the battlefield are unconvinced of the International Community's resolve to finish the war, less convinced that the demcratic government can secure the peace at all, much less without international support, and by effect of the atrocities unbelieving in the ability of the government to protect them at all.
Their choice as they see it is: complain to a government that cannot protect and risk greater reprisal or comply with the demands of the terrorists. This is the goal of the terrorists and hence overcoming that perceived choice is a key to overcoming the enemy.
I apologize that this is not so much an answer to your question as an explaination that refugees have a long history in warfare. But the conditions which create the situation are purposely done by the enemy, hence removable by them, and a basis for why we must continue to oppose that atrocious enemy. The cited report details much more that demonstrates why simply allowing them free reign is not a humanitarian option.
Why is it that after 7 years, so little progress is demonstrated?
Well, first I would point out that great progress has occurred, but largely goes unreported. Today education is an option to most Afghani children (and many adults) whether male or female as opposed to 2001 when fewer than 1 Million male Afghans were afforded the option only of an islamist education of hate. Medical care is much more available today than it was in 2001. Independent news media is available in Afghanistan. Other measures of progress can and should be cited to include road construction, electrical production, cell phone networks, and economic improvemnts.
In 7 years, we have helped bring Afghanistan from the 15th Century to the 20th Century.
But in other arenas, we are far from the degree of progress needed. This has several factors not least of which is the tribal loyalty, and great illiteracy of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Pakistani border. While it is easy to find fault with the Paki government, the fact is they are dealing with the same enemy as are Nato and Afghan forces. They are dealing with it in a stop and start manner, sometimes more effectively and sometimes less so, which is effected by their own National issues as well as international issues.
The Pashtuns are fiercely independent and Waziristan (an area which in reality covers both sides of that border) is outside the control of the Pakistan national government. The answer to this is not as easy as one would like and it is not surprising that when international tensions rise, they pull troops from that difficult internal struggle to a more popular international defense. I'm not saying it's the correct thing to do, strategically, tactically, or nationally, but I do recognize it is the easy decision politically.
Counter-Insurgency is one of the most difficult kinds of war. Insurgencies can occur for a number of reasons and hence the solution to one may not work in the next. They are fueled by the perception of wrong doing on the part of the government whether real or lies.
Counter-Insurgency is being conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, across Africa and in much of Asia. Of these, little is reported even in Afghanistan, where we are aware of the war. Some of those insurgencies have good basis and others do not. Few involve US Troops.
Many will state that we have a bad record in dealing with COIN, but that is not entirely true. Central and South America provide numerous examples of how we have quietly helped defeat insurgencies in the 80's and 90's. Few were short wars. Colombia has only quieted in the last few years after more than 6 decades of civil war but it is not complete. Iraq is now the most recent example of a successful COIN operation.
In Afghanistan, there exist many challenges that cannot be overcome quickly. Illiteracy and corruption run rampant. Education takes time and is a key to the future of that Nation and overcoming the insurgency.
Corruption is culturally ingrained, partially due to lifetimes in an active combat zone, but also as a part of standard 3rd World Nations. New authority figures are drawn from old authority figures that long practiced corruption, but also from those that were previously victims of corruption and not only accept it as part of doing business but embrace it as a means of income.
Corruption breeds a cycle of corruption and ending it is a key to preventing the cycle of insurgency. It is not dissimiliar to the cycle of abuse where the abused becomes an abuser of others. New insurgencies are fueled by a promise to overcome the current abuses, only to bring abuse by the incoming power and the cycle continues into the next iteration with a new insurgency force. When one only knows abuse, they come to accept it as the norm. When one only knows corruption, they come to expect it and use the norm when it benefits them.
If a person becomes a police officer having grown up subjected to police interrogations of torture and bribery of police officers, they will likely practice the same now that it benefits them. These norms are difficult cycles to break.
And training the new authorities in human and civil rights is made more difficult by fact that so few are literate.
Add to this the difficulties of "war by committee." American and European concepts are very different whether in how to organize a police force, the continuum of use of force by police and military, or the tactics of patrolling by military forces. Though complaints were issued back and forth about the number of other members of the Coalition in Iraq, the predominately American leadership made issues of tactics, techniques, and concepts of operation and conduct easier and more uniform in Iraq.
The political leadership of any Nation can cause changes to the above, but it is much more difficult when dealing with the political leadership of multiple Nations as well as the Military leadership of the same Nations. And to top all of that off, the liberal vs. conservative political leaderships of the Nations of NATO has reversed in the last 2 years. Europe (even France) largely went Conservative while the US pushed Liberal. The results of this will not be evident for some time. Throw in the ultimate in Liberal Ideologies (and the Professors of Professional Corruption), the United Nations, and things can get real screwy.
Add to this the 1990's change in overall War Policy brought on by the drastic cuts in our Military Forces from "Win-Win-Hold" to "Win-Hold-Win" and finally we begin to get the full picture. The former policy was that the United States would be able to simutaneously win two wars, with little outside help. The new policy was that we would be able to prevent a loss of one war while fighting and winning another.
In 2003, it was largely accepted that we had won in Afghanistan. Iraq was seen as the next stop and an easy win. It turned out that both of those were overly optimistic. We held in Afghanistan and won in Iraq. Now we are pushing to win the war that was a "hold." It is not that we ever turned our backs on Afghanistan. We did not. In 2003, there were only 10,000 boots on the ground, including NATO. In 2007 and today there were 50,000, evenly split between NATO and the US. Actually more now than in 2007.
The decision to secure the win in Iraq in 2004-2006 was the correct move. There were miscalculations in 2002-2003 as to the state of infrastructure and the ease of creating effective security forces as well as their sucseptibility to terrorist propaganda, but the Iraqis have less history of current conflict, greater levels of literacy and infrastructure, and became the central front in the War on Terror due to the decision of the enemy. Afghanistan requires greater patience, greater development from scratch of infrastructure, longer timeframes to overcome illiteracy, and greater emphasis on overcoming ingrained cultural acceptance of corruption and abuse by authority.
The combined efforts of establishing effective economies of successful democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, though challenging has long term positive effects, particularly in dealing with the origins of modern islamism and terrorism: Iran. There is one thing that the tyrannical dictatorship fears more than anything else: successful democracies on its borders. It's ultimate effective enemy has been Turkey for 3 decades. They have engaged in the same type of Cold War that existed between the USSR and USA for 5 decades. The addition of two new democracies to its borders scares the Ayatollah Khameni greatly. Much moreso than the fact that both have US Forces there.
I've covered diverse subjects here in a rather lengthy response but like I said, you're asking the tough questions, that are pertinent, but not easily nor simply answered.
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