War On Terror News previously reported on the unauthorized official leaks of the new Afghanistan policy and published the new policy in its entirety. Now, it's time to review the official policy as published by the Administration.
First, the policy is necessarily broad in some areas and perhaps a bit too detailed in others. The need for a broadly defined policy at this level is tied directly to the level of policy decision. Admiral Mullen, General Petraeus, and General McKiernan each need discretion to implement policy in their levels of decision making. The CinC should not be deciding which provinces and cities in which to deploy Troops.
I will assume that the decision to send the 82nd Airborne was made by Admiral Mullen in consultation with the Joint Chiefs, the Army Chief of Staff and the G1 of the Army, and merely reported by the CinC. I must further assume that this is not the same part of 82nd that is currently deployed.
The Obama Campaign Office Administration Press Release on the White Paper can be found on the official site. The first thing I will say is that it is time for the Administration to get off the campaign trail and end the attacks on his predecessor. There is no need for this kind of comment:
"But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq."
That is not leadership. It is making excuses and the blame game. Moreover, it is simply untrue.
Sticking with the press release, the President states:
"We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 -- and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward"
We need to throw up the caution flag on this one. If there is one lesson that should have been learned in the Current Conflicts, it is that an emphasis on quantity and quick in creating security forces for stateside political expediency out of civilians can and often does lead to a lack of quality and a lack of vetting. This is how we ended up with problems in the Iraqi Security Forces as well as in the Afghani Security Forces. But the lesson is of even greater pertinence in Afghanistan because of lower literacy rates and higher levels of stubborness in their people.
I can't tell you how many new Afghan soldiers and policemen can be added while increasing (not just maintaining) the level of quality, but the emphasis must be on quality. It will take longer to train the average Afghan Private than the average Iraq Private because of the educational level of recruits.
"This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency."
"At a time of economic crisis, it's tempting to believe that we can shortchange this civilian effort."
In the "unauthorized" official leak of the new policy, it was stated that the "dramatic increase" amounted to "hundreds." In his remarks, the CinC indicates the number of civilians sent will be hampered by our own economic conditions. This is only true if he continues to place more emphasis on funding ACORN than on funding Our National Defense. The increase in civilian assistance in Afghanistan can be manned by Americans and have a positive impact on the unemployment rolls.
Is there rampant corruption in Afghanistan, including in the national government? Yes. Corruption is as natural to Afghans as is breathing, lying, and eating. It can not be rooted out overnight, even if it is hampering the development of that ally. The way forward involves patience and a lot of mentoring of officials at every level. It involves the cultural education of those assigned mentors, but also the education of Afghans in general.
The current civil authorities are the authorities because of a lack of educated alternatives. Literacy itself is a precious commodity in Afghanistan. Those with HS educations are considered to be doctors and those with college degrees are rare. As such, corruption and powerful power brokers run rampant, particularly amongst the educated. It's much easier to be the sole power when you're the one with an education amongst those without it.
As such, I applaud the President for including educators in his civil task force. I'm not really sure how they will be able to do much, considering the language barrier and cultural barriers, but if properly organized with a clear cut agenda, such as training the trainers of schools, this could be a very effective method of improving the situation in Afghanistan.
I would include in that education program, an aggressive education program for the Afghan Security Forces that incorporates both the current members and a pre-Basic Trainee literacy program. Most current members cannot read their code of conduct. Field Manuals are useless in teaching recruits that can't sign their own name. This increases the time it takes to teach not only the basics, but also advanced techniques and more importantly Human and Civil Rights as related to Security operations.
Simply having a High School equivalency education program for recruits would be on the order of expanding the GI Bill to include a doctorate degree in the US Military.
Narcotics Program: This is the place to get our European allies involved. First off, it's more their problem than ours. The Heroin produced from Afghan poppy ends up in European streets, not here. If we want to pressure them to take a more active role, then this is the issue to do it on. It's also a way to put them in the more volatile south of the country.
Further, the seed-burn-seed plan may be a bit over the top. We're talking about average, illiterate Afghan farmers doing what they find necessary to feed their families. The counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan has long been fraught with problems, challenges, and ineptitude. The entire thing needs to be overhauled from the top to the bottom, but burning the fields isn't necessarily the best plan. Perhaps, it would be more effective to burn the field while providing a check of less than the value of what a wheat crop would be, then providing the seed, whether wheat, pomogranate, or grape vines.
But we must be careful of getting lost in the Poppy Weeds rather than pursuing the enemy. The farmer is simply caught in the middle. He is not yet our enemy and we should be careful that we don't make one out of him.
And in this agricultural vein, remember that Afghan farmers are hampered more from a lack of water than from a lack of ability to make things grow. That means well digging technology is needed more than agricultural experts.
And in looking to negotiate with the Taliban, the Administration demonstrates complete ignorance of the enemy. Let me say this one more time: The Taliban are by definition hard core islamists bent on subjecting Afghanis to inhumane dictatorship. The Taliban are un-islamic and use terror as their tactic and strategy. They are recruited primarily from the Pastun tribes, but there are no moderates of the Taliban. There are moderate Pashtuns, including President Karzai, but not moderate Taliban.
The Taliban are aided in their recruitment by the illiteracy of Afghanistan and the Pashtuns. A muslim that cannot read the Koran is reliant on the mullah to tell him what it says. A mullah of the Taliban has dreams of power and prestige beyond his small fiefdom and does not explain that suicide is haram, a cardinal sin which sends suicide bombers straight to hell.
In the new policy are allusions to undermining the National governments of our allies Afghanistan and Pakistan, while also statements of paradoxical support. There have been recent statements, as well as those from the campaign trail, of actions taken inside Pakistan, without authorization nor consultation, of installing a competing head of government alongside the duly elected President of Afghanistan. These suggestions need to be stopped in their tracks. Holbrooke needs to be removed.
There is a diplomatic means to explain to Islamabad that they can deal with the problems of Islamists, of Al-Qaeda, of the the Taliban, or that we will. But diplomacy of this type, in that culture, is best conducted quietly, behind closed doors, not in press releases and campaign speeches to the world, unless the CinC is actively trying to build AQ support and to force regime change in Pakistan. The policy of record of this administration towards our Ally demonstrates a complete lack of cultural awareness, unless he is attempting to drum Pakistani will to fight.
Such a strategy should be combined with an active informations operation to overcome AQ/Taliban propaganda as well as inform the Pashtuns of the dangers associated with our enemies, the retardation of technology in AQ/Taliban controlled areas, and anti-islamic atrocities being committed by them.
Additionally the IO campaign should broadcast throughout Afghanistan as the islamist propaganda campaign has often been allowed to be monopolize the microphone of information.
Also see: Uncle Jimbo's BlackFive Article Fresh from the Battle with Murtha, in which the EXMarine sent his lapdog out to explain the wise decision not to attempt a battle of wits with his intellectual superior named Uncle Jimbo, UJ has VERY pertinent words for the new CinC:
War on Terror News©2009, ARM, all rights reserved.
Related Articles on Karzai, the big picture, and Pakistan:
Karzai Part 1: Mayor of Kabul or Unprecedented Unifier?
The Bouhammer Chronicles on Karzai.
Bouhammer promises an article on this same subject article this friday
MsMarti's disdain for Karzai's remarks.
Bouhammer's disdain for Karzai's record/remarks.
Karzai: Politician, Diplomat, & Challenges.
Karzai: Media-Politician Relationship Challenges Winning Wars.
Dangerous Liasions: Mumbai Attacks.
Pakistan - An Ally Under Attack.
Obama the Candidate on Pakistan.
Crimes Against Islam: Proof of Taliban Atrocities Against Islam.
Stumble It!
