"It's another Viet Nam." This slogan has been used by both parties in every war started by their opposition since Congress forced Our Military to retreat from the battlefield and abandon an ally. Predictions of "the next Viet Nam" were used in Desert Storm and I believed them. That I was mentally prepared for a combat tour of a year probably helped me last the 4 days of the Ground War, but the mental anguish in anticipation was not helpful.
The other party used it to predict results in Somalia, Bosnia, & Kosovo. Little did we know, Somalia was the first battle in the War On Terror, against an enemy we did not know existed, and the minions he trained and equipped. They weren't "freedom fighters" either. Our Body Politic did cut and run in the same confusion as did we in 1983 Lebanon. The results were similar in that in both we faced a new enemy that we did not understand nor even recognize as a real entity.
In both cases, that enemy gained power and influence as a result. In both cases, the enemy would continue to haunt us, to taunt us, to attack us as a means of demonstrating our impotence. Both Lebanon and Somalia were too short to become a Viet Nam, and both were too short to declare a Victory, even though Our Troops performed superbly when allowed to by the body politic.
Bosnia & Kosovo have finally in recent years been declared successful. The UN only announced the end of mission in Kosovo in 2008 or thereabouts, but both are now considered successful independent Nations. Both fought against the same tyrannical dictator and won their independence from it with violent international support. Neither of these turned out to be the Viet Nams predicted, even though "those people had been killing each other for centuries and we shouldn't get involved in a civil war."
Iraq has twice made the "next Viet Nam" list and the prophecy appears to be wrong the second time as well. It's still a little early to tell because South Viet Nam did not fall while Our Troops defended it from a proxy force of the actual enemy (Soviet Union/China). It fell two years (1975) following withdrawal of our last "Combat Troops," (1973) almost to the day. It fell not from a lack of willpower on the part of its own people, but from a lack of bullets. It fell not from a lack of military ability but a lack of Congressional resolve. The South Vietnamese Army literally fought until they ran out of bullets. There is a whole set of myths surrounding Viet Nam, but the most important fact is that Our Troops fought Honorably and Victoriously. The enemy did not defeat Our Military. Congress defeated Our Ally.
Afghanistan has oft been predicted as the "next Viet Nam" and given it's status as "the Bear Trap" and "The Graveyard of Empires," one might expect that finally the prophecy could come true. Afterall, if you predict something enough, no matter how unlikely, you'll finally be proven right. "The broke clock is right twice a day." The United States has no designs for an Empire (I'll get to the Imperial myth as well.) Nor are we the Soviets. There are significant differences in the way we fight.
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to build their empire. Having acquired their new territory, they faced an independently minded mountain people against which they used a typical tyrannical approach to "COIN." That strategy of COIN (as CounterInsurgency is a type of warfare, not the specific strategy used in it) was based on brutal suppression of all opposition. It was the same COIN that had worked in Hungary, in Poland, in East Germany, and in Czechoslovakia.
It is the same kind of COIN Iran is using against the Persian People. It is very effective against a defeated people if they see no alternative, but fails against a proud people that view liberty as important as life itself. It loses its effectiveness against a people so defeated that they no longer feel they have anything to lose. It is failing in Iran and the tyrannical dictatorship is flailing to turn that tide of green.
Some do espouse the use of that strategy of COIN and it can be tempting to those frustrated with a difficult enemy. But that is not the American Way and it is not the Petraeus style of COIN. US COIN is much more expensive in both time and money. It is humane. It has at its core the demonstration of an alternative to violence as a means to change government. COIN is rarely needed in a benevolent society where government rules fairly. It is most often needed in a Nation whose collective memory has forgotten what good governance is.
Afghanistan is no exception. The closest thing they've known in centuries to good governance was a monarchy. Few Afghans alive today lived in that time. They have known brutal suppression, violence, corruption, and harsh terrain ever since. Life has never been easy in Afghanistan, but long ago, it was better. Corrupt officials became such a way of life that the newest generation sees it as a normal part of doing business. Changing that culture of corruption will not happen overnight.
As I pointed out in "The Abused," changing the norms of brutality by authority figures won't change overnight. Still, Afghans are expressing greater confidence in their government and police officers than they have in the past.
"You can't fight an enemy you can't see." This is true, except we aren't fighting Ghosts, even if at times it may feel that way. H. John Poole calls this 4th Generation Warfare or 4GW and it is a hybrid of organized crime, rebellion, tyranny, murder, and guerilla warfare along with the standard fare of "war is an extension politics on all fronts. It has diplomatic tactics, economic strategies, and a propaganda core. The guerilla warfare comes into play here.
When a militant force cannot defeat a conventional force, it uses its small size as an ability to hide in plain sight. In short, the guerilla hides amongst the civilian population. This protects the militant as well as sets up the Conventional Power for failure. If the government force gives into the natural frustration and attacks an unarmed bystander, the guerilla uses that for propaganda and recruitment. Our current enemies take it a step further and claim that their own forces killed in battle were unarmed civilians. The guerilla relies on material support from the civilian population but this enemy forces civilians onto the battlefield through coercion and threat of death to increase this propaganda effect.
It is central to the effort of this type of warfare to create the perception that the government cannot govern, that it cannot provide basic services, nor even security to its people, indeed not even to itself. The insurgent then builds on the perception of impotence of the government by adding the alternative, that the insurgent force itself is the only reliable source of security and governance.
To overcome the fear of the terrorist takes time. To do so, one can either inflict equal or greater fear of the government force, as does Iran, as did Iraq, as did the Soviet Union, OR one can build sufficient trust in the civilian population that they know that they will be protected from the threatening terrorist if they report him. This cannot be an idle promise. It must be real because if one cannot follow through, it serves the fears instilled by the terrorist and breaks down the trust of the government.
Not only does the government force have to demonstrate that it can safeguard the people, but also that it can find and strike the enemy that tries to threaten the people. But to find the enemy, the people must trust enough to tell the government who the enemy is and where he is hiding. That cycle of building trust takes time and demonstrated capability. When it is recognized that the government strikes the enemy with impunity rather than the other way around, the citizens will be more trusting that the government can protect them with the information it needs to do so.
Stumble It!
