Osama, as with many rich leaders, headed not only the “charity,” Al-Qaeda, but also for-profit corporations, primarily construction companies but also financial institutions, and terrorist organizations. Though of Yemeni descent, he was born in Saudi Arabia, and returned from the Soviet-Afghan war a favored son of the Saudis, a hero, whose father had a special relationship with the King himself.
Enamored with the Afghan success, marketed as a hero, and believing the hype, when Saddam invaded Kuwait and threatened the Saudi Kingdom, he offered to lead the mujhadeen veterans in defense of the two kingdoms against the secular tyrant. His enormous pride was wounded when his offer was rejected by the King, in preference of the more tested, but secret ally’s offer: the United States.
Pragmatism overruled ideology and religion in the decision. The world’s 4th largest military (Iraq) would be challenged by the last superpower, not the ragtag force that had taken down the other superpower. The firebrand Osama took great offense that the King had less confidence in his military abilities.
The Wahhabi sect (based in Saudi Arabia) of Sunni Islam has some of the strictest ideologies, but the Islamism of Osama was of greater radicalization. The Shi’a sects of Islam also have historical political implications from which the Shi’a Islam was incubated. One would expect the militants of these two to be even more opposed than the populace, but in most places, to include Iraq, Shi’a and Sunni have traditionally lived together in peace.
Islamist terrorism began with Shi’a militants, the most known of which were Hezbollah. Hezbollah was and is directly controlled by Iran, from its infancy. Sunni strains of Islamist terrorism came to the table much later. Hamas is a Sunni terrorist organization, but is also directly controlled by the Shi’a Islamist government of Iran.
One would therefore expect that the Wahhabi based Islamism of Osama would be in direct conflict with the Shi’a based Islamism of the Ayatollah Khameni's Iran. And while at times, it may have been, pragmatism and greed of empowerment overcame those differences. The center of this alliance occurred in The Sudan in the 1990’s.
When the Ayatollah Khomeni seized power on the blood of Democratic Persian Rebels in Iran, he immediately set out on a course of Islamist expansion. His initial goal had been Iraq and its young secular dictator, Saddam. Saddam’s own grandiose plans fed into the war, turning it from minor skirmishes and sabotage against Iraq into a full-scale war. This led to the Iran-Iraq war and the pragmatic realization that Islamism was not yet strong enough for such a grandiose plan.
As a result, Khomeni directed his terrorist enterprise towards Egypt and Lebanon which appeared to be more achievable. Lebanon can be considered a success with the advent of Hezbollah as a shadow government, a political entity, and a military force which even UN peacekeepers and Lebanese Military forces won’t confront.
Egypt on the other hand saw some successes that eventually faltered. In the process though, The Sudan became a key ally with Turabi, a Sunni Islamist, as its tyrant. Initially, this was likely an alliance of convenience of two entities with one common enemy. But the rise of The Sudan as an Islamist state strategically situated on the Egyptian border created an environment ripe for breeding terrorism.
The Sudan provided Iran with plausible deniability in its own export of terrorism while also becoming a safe haven for Sunni Islamists such as Osama. The early 90’s saw Khartoum as a hotbed for all kinds of malcontents, so long as the Turabi government got their cut.
It was here that Osama was first identified by US Intelligence Agencies as a future problem of great magnitude, while Billy Waugh was searching out the pre-eminent terrorist of the day: Carlos The Jackal. (See: Hunting The Jackal by CSM(Ret) Billy Waugh.) While his work succeeded in capturing the first pictures of Carlos in decades and in the capture of Carlos the Jackal by French authorities, the US Administration declined to capture the Jackal or eliminate OBL as recommended.
As Turabi consolidated power, the finances afforded it by sources to include Iran and Osama, and the infrastructure construction provided by Osama became a key to maintaining Turabi’s rule and attaining The Sudan’s centrality in the future of terrorism.
Osama became the financial guru who set up tangled tentacles throughout worldwide financial institutions; including the Catholic Churches own BCCI, to move money from the Arab elites and Iranian government, as well as criminal enterprises and “charities” into terrorist finances. As a few established key financial institutions, such as BCCI, were exposed, it was OBL that created a system so complex and embedded that even today, the best accountants have not uncovered all of it.
Osama was quickly moving from a glorified hero of Afghanistan, to a feared upstart, in the eyes of the Saudi Monarchy. Osama’s message demonstrated the potential threat to their rule. The Monarchy attempted to distance him physically, while not being positioned to be implicated in anything untoward to the popular “hero” they had helped create. When the US Administration refused to accept their help in capturing him, the Saudis turned to appeasing both the Iranians and their own Islamist firebrand.
The Saudi government literally held the reins of power by a string and a popular uprising would likely have led to an Islamist government of the strictest kind. Iran, The Sudan, OBL, and other actors were actively working towards it. Two things appeared to them to stand in their way: US and Egyptian alliances with the Saudis. Breaking these alliances became the focus in hopes that it would in turn set the stage for an overthrow of the monarchy.
War On Terror News ©2007-2010 War On Terror News ARM, all rights reserved.
Previous: 2/8/2010: Part 1 Base of Islamism Motivations
2/10/2010: Part 2 Rise of the Anti-Mohammed
2/11/2010: Part 3 Islamist Alliances
2/11/2010: Part 4: Unholy Alliances
2/13/2010: Part 5: Prophecies Fulfilled
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