The current Administration has requested and gotten approved cuts of 49,000 US Soldiers, in the Active Army alone. In 2009, it began to cut 20,000 from the National Guard, quietly, without publicity. This year, Fiscal Year 2012, which began on October 1, 2011, begins the Active Army's implementation of the 1st cuts implemented by the current Administration. This is not the first time in military history that the military has been reduced in size, but it is the first time that it has occurred during a war. And the Secretary of Defense, along with members of the Joint Chiefs have warned that these cuts may not be over.
This begs the question: How big must the military be in order to succeed in it's mission? Well, the answer depends on the question of what the politicians expect our military to be able to do? And here we need the historical context of how that has changed in the last 3 decades. (Expanded version of this article.)
In the 1980's, we faced an expanding Empire, that challenged the United States and Our Allies technologically, as well as exceeded our numerical capacity. Our Allies in Europe and Asia understood the threat that Communism posed and helped bridge the numerical disadvantage, while we accelerated our technological edge and developed a Professional edge in Troops that volunteered to stand the wall, and in sufficient numbers dedicated their lives to that pursuit. The mission was defined as the capacity to fight and win TWO prolonged wars/fronts simultaneously.
Without a perceived threat, and as we watched our potential enemies fall one by one, to their own people, the Allies determined that we should cash in "The Peace Dividend." We could cut back the amounts we spent on defense, as we were "entering a period of peace," where no nation could realistically challenge us on the battlefield.
The Bush Administration concluded that in a world of only one Superpower, that 12 Army Divisions, with only 100,000, not 250,000 stationed in Germany, could fight and win 2 wars. It was politically easier to reduce the number of Troops overseas than in the Congressional Districts of politicians, because Troops spend money on the local economy, even where those Troops are not liked. Still, 6 fewer Divisions, meant there would also be fewer stateside bases, so an independent commission was set up to decide which weren't needed anymore.
The collective memory of a stunning Victory in Iraq, soon turned into a festering wound, as President H.W. Bush was questioned for "not finishing the job," as Saddam continued to posture, and denied he had lost. The President who had seen his approval rate soar as a result of his resolve and reliance on General Powell and General Schwarzkopf to get the job done, saw it plummet as a result of his dithering on Tianamen Square, and the resulting economic downturn of decreased military spending. Between the saber-rattling of Saddam, the dire economic predictions, his caving in to Congress on his pledge of "Read my lips: No New Taxes," and the apparent reliance on polls to tell him what to do over Tianamen Square, the electorate turned against him and chose a replacement.
The Clinton Administration decided to cut the military more, from 12 to 10 Divisions, to close and give away even more Military bases, inside the United States, to promote a plan to "take care of Military Families," which meant that spending in the Military went to stateside construction projects, rather than equipment, supplies, and training. And oddly, while the Administration was expanding operations to pay for the give-aways of Military bases, it was forcing private owners of lands to "sell" it to the Government for "National Parks." It was costly on every front, both the giveaways to local government and the forced acquisitions from private individuals.
But even the Administration admitted that 10 Divisions weren't enough to win Two Wars, simultaneously. So, it developed the 1 + 1 policy. This policy called for being able to win one war, while fighting the 2nd to a stalemate until the first war was concluded. The danger of this policy was that should the first war start, everyone knew the 2nd would be fought only to prevent defeat, not to win. So, anytime we committed to war, there would be a risk. As we committed in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Haiti, and in Kosovo, we were cautious to not overextend to allow the North Koreans or others to think we couldn't commit.
In the Middle East, every President since Carter was elected sought the elusive goal of being "The One" that brought peace. It represented a chance at the Nobel Peace Prize that Carter had achieved by his partial success in negotiating away the Egyptian-Israeli part of the conflict.
Our Troops were actively involved in Combat Zones in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo on the day Clinton left office, but none of those were full scale wars. General Shinseki had been pursuing a policy of converting Our Army from a force prepared for Conventional War, meaning Army vs. Army using bullets, bombs, and rockets, with front lines, to one of Peacekeeping, where there are no front lines, but an attempt to convince local forces not to attack each other. Shinseki had attempted to remove armored tracks, Tanks and APC's, and replace them with wheeled, light skinned armor that could withstand sniper fire as seen in Bosnia.
The disconnect between the Administration and the Troops he commanded also created political risk in committing them to the risk of the Ultimate Sacrifice.
Because the perception in January 2001 was that there was no massive enemy poised to strike, there was no political resolve to massively increase the size of the Military, or the Military Budget. There seemed to be no pressing need to update the capacity of the Military to fight unknown or unexpected enemies. The Military had found it's most pressing mission to be the War On Drugs and at the turn of the Millennium was beginning to see results, as the political leadership had finally demonstrated resolve in Colombia, which had reduced the violence and influence of cartels and Communist Terrorists there significantly by 2003, though it had been a less public campaign for the previous decade.
As a result of 9/11, we took the war to the enemy. And when the President asked for viable options to do so, many challenges arose. It was a land-locked country with no truly friendly allies bordering it. There wasn't a beachhead to be taken. Deals would have to be made with less than savory allies of varying degrees of interest in cooperation. Hillary and Bush both reiterated that Nations were "either with us or against us," and that bi-partisan resolve was sufficient to persuade Pakistan that they didn't want to be against us. Musharraf opened his airspace and a few secret bases for us to operate against their former ally. That came with secret strings to prevent negative responses in both populations: his and ours, but got the job done.
The War in Afghanistan was an "Unconventional War," meaning that it was fought by a small number of Special Operations, fighting alongside Afghans. It was not the kind of war General Tommy Franks liked or wanted, but it was the one that we could win. Special Forces proved they still had it, in the kind of war they were designed to fight. 200 Special Forces Troops, primarily, from 5th Special Forces Group, along with Afghan allies, including Hamid Karzai himself, and many others later described as "War Lords" defeated the Taliban Government much faster than even the top Generals expected. A significant amount of that Victory included the use of Air assets, to the point that many may have thought it was again air alone that won the war. It wasn't.
The "1+1" Strategy was working, because the War in Afghanistan was not a major conventional war. We still had virtually the entire US Military available for a war. And the Troops stationed in combat zones in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere were not sufficiently engaged by enemies to warrant either significant media attention, or concern that those were a true war. More than 10 years after the Cease Fire in Iraq, Iraqi forces were still shooting at our pilots patrolling the No-Fly zones.
In 2002 and 2003, the new focus on providing a technological advantage to the Ground Forces had still not had sufficient opportunity to outfit 10,000 Troops in Afghanistan with Body Armor or Armored HumVees, let alone advanced radios. Suddenly, the advent of a war without a front created an urgency in the American population, for body armor to be available to the Troops and for HumVees to be armored. It didn't matter that the HumVee was not designed as a combat vehicle or that there had never been wide spread use of body armor in modern battle. Suddenly it was "Bush's Fault" that he had not ordered it, not Clinton's, or Bush Sr's, or Reagan's, or Carter's that no one had thought to increase the personal protection measures that had not been on the battlefield since the days of Knights, Swords, and the advent of firearms that had rendered personal Armor ineffective.
But a new concern was on the horizon: Everyone knew that Saddam had Chemical & Biological Weapons, WMD, and was pursuing nukes. Nancy Pelosi, Bill & Hillary Clinton, and others in both parties confirmed that this was no secret to them. Fewer knew that Saddam and bin Laden had pursued an unholy alliance based in the animosity between Bill Clinton and Saddam, a limited alliance of convenience, but many knew that Saddam had been supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, along with any other terrorist in Palestine for decades. Saddam even complained that his unwavering support of terrorists against Israel went unthanked by his Arab neighbors.
When Bush Jr convinced Congress, with bi-partisan support, to authorize the use of force in Iraq, it was the opening of the FIRST Conventional War in the 1+1 policy. The +1 contingency wasn't Afghanistan, which was considered won, but with North Korea. The +1 fear was Liberia, Serbia, Syria, Libya, and Iran. Iraq was a conventional war, and it too led to Victory faster than the Generals expected. Iraq was won very fast. Saddam's forces put up more of a fight than in 1991, but still crumbled against a superior force of a smaller size than 1991.
By the end of 2003, we had won two wars, one Conventional and one Unconventional, while seeing the effects of our resolve work to remove the atrocious dictator of Liberia through "battleship diplomacy," and see the old belligerent, Iran, get very nervous, and quiet with US Troops on two borders. Soon Qaddaffi would voluntarily give up his own WMD program, and even Kim Il Jong made overtures to appease the world of his own programs.
Though stunned by the response of the United States, the primary enemy in the Global War On Terror not only recovered, but had a long term plan. They determined that Iraq would be the central battlefield. It was more advanced and more important, strategically and historically than the land lost in time, Afghanistan. The long term plan of the enemy was not a new strategy, but was based on American history in Viet Nam, the rallying cry of war protesters since their victory in defeating American resolve in that era.
It took 6 years, before the Bush Administration decided that "Nation Building" was an important part of winning. He had campaigned against the policy in 2000, and it was at the darkest hour of the War in Iraq, when General Petraeus was chosen as the man with the plan to turn things around. It was called "COIN," and had just been re-written. Adopting the Petraeus Plan was in many ways an admission he had been wrong. It was an admission that McCain had been right in his calls for more Troops, that the opposing party had been right for its policy of Nation Building, that the situation in Iraq was spinning out of control.
Counter-Insurgency wasn't a new concept. The manual had been there for a long time, but the Petraeus Plan was a different kind of Counter-Insurgency. It included Nation Building, as well as an aggressive offensive against the enemy, even if it avoided the term.
Politics effect the battlefield, almost universally in a negative manner, and the political campaigns of 2004 to 2008 were no different. Between the time Congress had in bi-partisanship approved a War in Iraq and the war had started, one party had turned against it, and the 2004 campaign used it as a wedge issue. By 2006, the public had largely turned against it, based more on slogans than reality. It had been claimed, repeated, and was believed that Troops in Afghanistan had been decreased to send to Iraq. It wasn't true, but it made for a good campaign. Politicians ignored 25 arguments they had supported in 2002 for the war, as well as their own stated convictions for the 1 they claimed was disproven.
It was good enough to change the party in power from 2002 to 2008. The party that campaigned against the War in Iraq, that campaigned for retreat from the war, took complete power in Washington in 2009, and not even the POTUS could change that direction he had set in place on the campaign trail. He was able to ignore his campaign promise to pull ALL Troops out within 18 months, but he was unable to convince the Iraqi Shi'a government to reconsider an agreement for US Troops to stay past the 36 month mark.
So, with the "Total Army Force" (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) being reduced by 69,000 between 2009 and 2014, is it possible to still achieve the policy objectives of the National Command Structure? If one assumes that the new policy is to fight only in the Counter-Terrorism spectrum, and only within Coalitions in Conventional Wars, maybe. If one relies on drones, rather than humans on the battlefield perhaps.
It appears to this Veteran that has not only witnessed these threats and wars, but participated in them, from the Cold War through Iraq & Afghanistan, that the politicians decided to cut the Military, without a stated policy, but that the new policy could best be called the "+1 policy", i.e. that the politicians hope that the Military can fight to a stalemate, long enough for the Military to be rebuilt, during a war. That would cost a LOT of American lives, and the entire policy is based on the "hope" that by retreating from Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be enough of a Military force to hold the line until a new enemy attacks.
Stumble It!
