The Military is a love-hate relationship for those that serve. Or as I said when I was in, "an addiction." The higher I was promoted, the more I realized how little authority I really had. It's the guys on the ground that best understand the situation in their part of battlefield, and yet policies from the top that most hamper their ability to deal with the situation most effectively. After a discussion this morning with one of the Warriors on the ground, I've reflected on some of the challenges we face.
It brought back memories and put in perspective some of the current conditions. The political situation in the US has a huge impact on the orders given on the battlefield. Unfortunately, politicians are almost always in an "urgent" situation, needing to be able to show results faster than they can be produced. Our Generals need to have the backbone to tell politicians the unvarnished truth, that certain equipment is critical to success, that desired timelines may be unrealistic, that the politicians can set goals and provide the means to attain them, but that restricting resources means longer timelines.
Generals must be politically savy, but should avoid being politicians. Their actions, policies, and advice must understand the political situation, but should not be shaped on party lines, nor pander to political slogans. While we try here to avoid getting into the Generals' lanes, when they step out of their lane, they sometimes need that reminder.
One of the greatest pitfalls a senior officer can fall into is attempting to micromanage those battlefield leaders. I've said it many times: The commander on the ground, who can feel the zip of bullets and smell the cordite must be enabled to make the decisions, no matter how instant the video feeds and communications to the big screen in Bagram. It's helpful for the guy watching the screen to relay information on where he sees muzzleflashes and to order air support to the area, but the commander on the ground, has to be able to control his men and the actions of the birds in his airspace.
Just as pertinent, that battlefield commander must be able to determine what Civil Affairs efforts should be applied to his Area of Operations (AO). It can be counter-productive to rush in a medical assistance effort to an area still under enemy control. At best, it can divert the efforts of the Warrior to a role of protecting the medics. At worst, as happened a year or so ago in Baraki Barak, the medical team can be run out of town under enemy fire, or killed.
When an American Military team retreats from battle in front of the population they are there to protect and help, it doesn't matter if its a bunch of clerks, medics, or Infantry Squad, it undermines the trust of those locals that the US Military has capability and will to overcome the enemy. The Afghans don't see an Infantryman and a Clerk. They see two US Soldiers. The answer is not to abandon the medical assistance mission, nor to await the day that a lone doctor can walk the streets armed only with a stethoscope, but it is certainly not to send a small medical team to a village on the edge of Taliban control.
Clear, Hold, Build. It is a sequence. And it doesn't matter how quickly politicians and Generals want results, though the timeline of results is dependent on the resources they're willing to commit. If the politicians want quicker results, they must authorize greater resources. With limited resources, Generals must prioritize where they are applied, but there will always be a component of time. Trust is not wisely given without the test of time and Afghans apply that test of time before they give trust, which is key to results.
It reminds me of a sign I saw in an appliance repair shop:
"We can do your repair fast, cheaply, and well. You can choose any two, but not three."
Desert Storm was fast and complete (mission to remove Saddam from Kuwait), but it wasn't cheap. We applied the overwhelming force concept. OEF part 1 (defeating Saddam's Army) was fast and cheap, but allowed an insurgency to develop. OEF part 3 (Petraeus Plan/Surge) was slow and quality, though still not complete. If you want a secure, capable democratric ally in Afghanistan, it will take time to develop the Afghan ability to govern, as well as teach Afghans to soldier, but it will take longer with fewer resources.
Bridges can be a very effective means of improving the lives of locals, and hence building trust, but if the area is a flat plain, a bridge isn't needed. Building a clinic can be a great idea, but if you have no medical personnel to staff it, or the enemy will overrun it, or kill any person treated at it, the building is an ineffective expense which wastes time and money that could do more important things. What works in Konduz won't necessarily work in Khowst.
Too often, Americans think that every problem is a matter of insufficient funds. There is and always will be a certain amount of waste in a large budget, but that doesn't mean that wasted funds should be spent, just to ensure as much will be budgeted the next year. That mentality is enforced in the military, the education system, and every other arena of government because politics plays into bureacracy. It breeds wasteful spending, transparent to the politicians as well as the public.
Money is a means, not a solution. When misapplied, no matter how well meaning, it can be destructive to the desired goals. This is most evident when Americans are introduced to a "poor" economy of a nation. An American shopper might find a deal on something that costs much more back home, and whether failing to take into account the bartering of price inherent in the local market place, or believing that over paying the local market conditions puts more money into the shopkeepers pocket, over pay for the product. It seems harmless enough, even generous.
The result of overpaying is not just that the recipient is enriched, but that he raises his prices, particularly in dealing with Americans, which become his preferred customers. For our example, we'll say the Americans are buying chickens, as the procurement officers for dining facilities. Let's say the average person earns $5/day and the pre-American price is $1/chicken. Our generous procurement officer has an American budget and pays $5/chicken, which soon becomes the local price. Chicken farmers all want to sell to Americans, but with the inflated price the average worker now has to work an entire day to buy a chicken. It may not have seemed like a bad idea to pay too much for the chickens, but it has effectively priced the locals out of eating chicken.
In the financial vein, another allegorical context is also appropriate. Giving away stuff can also be counter-productive. The author of Rich Dad, Poor Dad explains this well. Some things are not assets, but liabilities. If you gave a 2011 Cadillac to a homeless man, it may seem very generous, but aside from having a better place to sleep, you've just given him the costs of insurance, gasoline, a driver's license, and annual license plates, possibly even the monthly payment on the loan. Even if he parks the car, without maintenance the tires will dry rot, the engine seize up, and without current plates, the police will tow it. The gift has increased his bills beyond his capacity to pay them and before long he'll be back to where he started. He may in fact be better off if you gave him a refrigerator box and a sleeping bag.
In some ways, we are doing the same thing with Afghanistan. Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) are great equipment on the nighttime battlefield, but they're technologically sensitive. I don't know if we are or are not fielding NVGs to the Afghan National Army (ANA), but such generosity could be counter-productive. If our long term plan does not include teaching the Afghan Government and people sufficient self-reliance to develop a Defense Budget that can maintain the NVGs after our involvement is over, those pieces of equipment will eventually break and not be replaced. If, in the meantime, we've created a reliance on NVGs in the ANA Troops we've trained, the lack thereof will create a capacity breakdown when they no longer have them.
Just paying the Afghan Army may be more than the Afghan Government can do and its certainly been one of the challenges there. Our plan has to take into account what the Afghan Government can maintain after we're gone.
The reason why the stingers we gave the mujahadeen have not been a significant threat in our presence there is that the technology was too fragile for the test of desert time. They didn't maintain it and the missile systems broke down.
The streets of Kabul are now an example of political ideology, misused (wasted) money, and ineffective ideas converging. We recently reported on the installation of 28 solar streetlights at a cost of $200,000. AMB Eikenberry's wife was there for the celebration. Honestly, I cannot tell you what it would cost to install a standard streetlight, but I'm pretty sure the Afghan price is not $7,142.85, particularly not when the poles are already there.
Now, Afghanistan is a prime location to use solar power, but $200,000 can build a lot of classrooms and the excuse of the Colonel that he has more money in his budget than he can use is insufficient for an effort that does not provide much illumination for that kind of money. In fact, that much money would have made a nice deposit on power generation facilities in that part of the world.
In COL Jack Jacob's (MoH) book, he relates a battle story, where he was told "Do Something," even if its wrong. It saved his life and the lives of his men, as it broke the inertia of being frozen with indecision in the heat of battle. In battle, split second decisions are an absolute must. If you stand there long enough, the enemy will eventually put a bullet in you, your men will lose confidence in you, and if you survive the ordeal, you'll be left in the rear to avoid the liability in the next battle.
On the other hand, in the scope of Civil Affairs(CA), you have time to consider how best to positively effect your AO, with the budget the Army affords you. Putting up 28 beacons in the sky that don't illuminate the street any more than existing storefront lights, is not the best answer, particularly not at $200k for 28 of them. There's already a plan to spend $1Million more. The Engineering Colonel had an obligation to tell that to the Ambassador, and he very well may have done so. Given the accounts of Bouhammer on Eikenberry, I wouldn't be surprised at all if the Ambassador demanded his way.
When the CA side of the house builds a mud brick style school, it can last centuries and rely on local skills. If it instead insists on building out of medal, with electric lighting, it is introducing a high maintenance system that costs a lot more and uses skills unknown to Afghans. The headmaster may decide to make money selling electricity, wearing out the equipment that he can't replace. Keep it simple and the biggest challenge is then finding teachers.
Often, we focus on the "non-kinetic" story, or as one Warrior called it: the "feel good" stories. Neither he nor I mean this in a negative manner. The stories of schools, clinics, and power-plants have their place. It is a part of the way we win this war. But these efforts alone won't win. Those schools and clinics have to be free from Taliban threat. In short, we have to kill or capture the enemy so the kids can go to the schools without fear.
I cannot emphasize enough how important education is to the future security of Afghanistan and to Our Own Nation. While Our Citizens may choose to not read the US Constitution or the rest of the story of the War In Afghanistan, most Afghans don't have the ability to read their fledgling newspapers and websites. They are forced, through illiteracy, to rely on word of mouth or radio, if there is a station in their area, for news of what is going on.
It makes the Civil Affairs effort all that much more local. The effects of good deeds have an effective range of how far the people travel and talk about it. The Taliban on the other hand have very effectively used that word of mouth to spread lies and propaganda. They've claimed to be destroying tanks for years, while the first tanks only arrived weeks ago. They claim their battle dead are civilians killed by us. According to the Taliban, I've been killed half a dozen times. The MSM has repeated their lies, but most importantly when those lies are the only news Afghans have, they have no reason to doubt it.
While I'd like to think a decision maker was reading when I suggested that literacy should be a benefit of joining the ANA, it was a common sense decision to make, and it's equally as likely that some NCO, frustrated with trying to teach Afghans something, sent the idea up the chain, where it's just as likely that an Officer along the way claimed it as his own great idea. It's simply that much easier to teach those that know how to read, particularly if one of the subjects is Human Rights, but also if its patrolling techniques.
The challenges of winning in Afghanistan are most often confronted and overcome by our small unit leaders, but require the enabling of Senior Officers, who must trust their Troops. Money is not the solution, but a necessary means of applying the means. The small unit commander needs to have the capacity to apply that money effectively, without threat of losing the budget if its unneeded in the first year, but half of whats needed in the next. The non-kinetic effort is very important, but again, the small unit leader needs the authority to determine the what and when of his AO. And the General needs to have the latitude to get the resources needed to the battlefield.
The biggest challenge in 2011 Afghanistan will be politicians impatient to declare results, without the willingness to risk sufficient resources to attain them. The reason Victory is important is the same in 2010 as it was in 2001. The enemy is currently called an insurgent though on 9/11 it was a government and their terrorist leeches. The impetus that strengthened our resolve was 9/11, but the war had been declared by the enemy in 1996 & 1998, and the attacks were not new in 1994.
The challenges to Our Troops are peacetime bureacracy in a combat environment, but if we empower Our Troops to think and overcome the challenges, we will win. The problem is not a lack of resolve or capability of Our Warriors, but a lack of resources and patience by Our People and Politicians. It doesn't mean throwing more money at it, but applying the money more effectively. The Afghan Elder is not on the same timeline as the American Politician and he's not going to extend trust to those that have already said they'll be gone next year, nor the med team that runs from a battle.
Stumble It!
