Bouhammer wonders how "increased violence" can be valid at the same time as the enemy's loss of momentum. It's a valid question, but one which recent history has demonstrated. The problem is not in the seemingly paradoxical statements by an Admiral parroting a political platform, but in what the results of those statements are geared towards. Troy is correct to ask how the two can both be true.
In 2007, as the Petraeus Plan was implemented, we saw the highest levels of violence in the Iraq War. In a previous version of this site, I had been chastising McCain for his calls for an increase in Troop Strength there, and expressing support for Military leaders to be given the latitude to win the war. So, when other Senators lambasted General Petraeus in the concert with the "General Betrayus" ads of their patriarch George Soros, I also spoke out against them.
The enemy is being defeated in every part of Afghanistan that General Petraeus can commit Troops. They are losing everywhere we confront them. The problem is that we have not eliminated the enemy in either Iraq or Afghanistan. And no matter what the politicians tell us, they know the enemy still exists in both countries. "Leaders" can artificially reduce enemy contact, as they have in Iraq, by pulling the Troops back into the walls of FOBs, but they cannot aritificially reduce the presence of the enemy. The enemy can find a way to attack and is only emboldened by the risk averse, defensive postures. Recent combat actions, inside the walls, in Iraq demonstrate that.
The Petraeus Plan in Iraq was not merely a "Surge" as the politicians wanted us to call it. The way I knew it was working, even as the number of KIA's was climbing was by looking at the cause of death of Our Troops. More were being killed by small arms fire and the percentage lost to IED's, mortars, and rockets diminished. That told me that we were finally taking the fight to the enemy. We were no longer just waiting for the enemy to lob explosives at us. We were no longer simply allowing him to set up safe havens whereever he could terrorize the population. There were other parts of the Petreaus Plan, but this was a key element.
In the darkest days of the Petraeus Plan, the CinC remained committed to Our General. The current CinC has a record of firing Generals (McKiernan & McChrystal) while undermining their stated resource requirements. The only thing General Petraeus has going for him is that the CinC cannot afford to make it 3 in a row. The main thing he has working against him is that he is unlikely to publicly complain of the lack of support.
Because the enemy in Afghanistan is primarily the Taliban, not Al-Qaeda (as in Iraq), the key numbers to watch are not the means of death of Our Troops, but the numbers of surrenders. Because the current administration has forced a catch and release program on Our Warriors, the enemy has taken to surrender rather than fighting when faced with an armed opponent. For this reason, more than 80% of raids (now called "cordon and search") result in the enemy surrendering without a shot fired.
Key news from Afghanistan is rarely the number of enemy killed, but the number of leaders captured. Key news from Afghanistan is not the number of Troops killed, but the number of civilians killed by the enemy. The key battlefields are not the cities, as they were in Iraq, but the villages, like Sangin. Urban warfare is bloody but once a city is taken, it is easy to control. There's a limited number of roads in and out. Hence the great turn of events in Ramadi and Fallujah.
The barren desert landscape, on the other hand, holds paradoxically numerous places to hide. We still have fewer Troops in Afghanistan than we had pre-surge in Iraq.
1990's policies still afflict our abilities to win even as the Secretary of Defense calls for "peace dividend" style cuts at the height of the war in Afghanistan. Both sides of the aisle find it politically expedient to quote the latest number of KIA's while few contrast just how low these numbers are in comparison to every other war we've fought. Hardly anyone notes how many losses the enemy is taking and the DoD makes it difficult to determine precise numbers, purposely using vague terms such as "several" and "numerous" but even with more than 80% of conflicts ending in non-combat surrenders, enemy dead are stacking up like cordwood.
In the 90's, the politicians decided on the "One plus one" strategy putting an end to the "Two Wars" strategy. Simply stated, rather than maintaining a military that could fight and win on two fronts, the politicians decided we only needed to be able to win one war at a time, while maintaining a stalemate, or just not losing the second war until the first was won. We haven't really won in Iraq, but it is now in stalemate mode as we hand over and hope the Iraqis can maintain a defense against both Al-Qaeda and Iranian Hezbollah. The growing alliance between al-Maliki, al-Sadr, and Iran in many ways neutralizes the primary threat, but is particularly troublesome for an American alliance.
For years, not even DoD has been willing to admit the Iranian threat, even while noting the origin of the weapons used against Our Troops in Iraq. Hezbollah and the Mehdi Militia were labeled "criminals" in military reports, while Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq were labeled "terrorists" or "insurgents."
Can we be "winning" in Afghanistan while the prediction stands that violence will increase? Yes. Winning involves making contact with the enemy, which means rising violence. The problem is not the validity of these two statements, but in the decisions that will be made based on this "winning" despite the increased violence. The administration has stubbornly held to its plan to begin retreat in July 2011, even while trying to persuade all sides that it will "withdraw based on conditions on the ground, in July 2011."
The previous administration maintained the stalemate in Afghanistan that the administration before it implemented in the "one plus one" strategy. The current administration has tried to please everyone in its rhetoric, but refuses to provide the General with the resources needed to actually win. It has returned to the policy of treating terrorism as a law enforcement matter and I fully expect will use the fact that momentum has turned against the enemy to remove the momentum of Our Troops. The question in my mind is not if there will be fewer Troops will be in Afghanistan at the end of 2011, but how many fewer Troops and how many fewer allied nations?
Stumble It!
