Historically, Wars are made up of multiple battles with a Nation-State enemy commanding its own military forces, whose capital is generally captured and Generals/Politicians forced to the table of surrender. Civil Wars are more difficult to define in terms of the enemy because it is not a Nation-State, but group of citizens who've taken up arms against their own government. Interested Nation-States often throw allegiance behind the government or the rebels, as did France in the American Revolution and Britain for the Confederacy in the Civil War.
Missing from current wars is that clearly defined objective which means Victory. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan had it, but the aftermath has not. Bush believed (in my opinion) it so obvious, that he failed to explain why defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq was important or why defending the young Iraqi Democracy was in the interests of the Middle East and the United States. He allowed his political opposition to instead claim there were no Al-Qaeda in Iraq, until support for Victory was near completed eroded.
It is no wonder then that the Administration cannot provide the narrative of what the goal in Afghanistan is. Unlike the campaign trail, where he claimed it would be his "top priority," the reality of the Administration is to shuffle it off to a back corner, to be dealt with only as much as he must. It is left to General Petraeus, as it was his predecessors, to figure out how to win with limited resources and a combative set of "diplomats," more set on tearing down the Military than working together for success.
A big piece of winning a Counter-Insurgency war is information. It is more difficult to define the battle space when the enemy is without a uniform and slips into the civilian population, even holding hostage civilians in hopes that civilians will be killed in their own defeats. General Petraeus understands the information component better than most and he understand his authored strategy better than most.
But COIN itself is many small pieces, villages won, one by one, with the locality much more important than the Forward Edge of the Battlefield. Each village is different with different needs and those local commanders must be supported by the highest levels in making the decisions about what is more important, a bridge or a school. The Captain and the Sergeant First Class are the keys to winning. They must have the wisdom and the trust to decide when to pursue the enemy and when to defend the town from the enemy.
Gardez is not Ghazni and Konduz is not Kandahar, just as Iraq is not Afghanistan, and the concept of a Suicide Bomber is counter to any logic of an American College Student. Play a game of chess with an illiterate Afghan Police officer and you'll learn that ignorance is not stupidity. Attempt to teach him marksmanship and you'll learn that education does not trump pride.
COIN is a local strategy executed on a National level. But to understand its effectiveness, one must view it as a locality and see it repeated across several localities. Using the search engine at the top left, which searches multiple sites relevant to the Military, these are the top 10 (of 100+) results for "Marjah," one of the current key battlefields:
Marines Open Marjah Market - War On Terror News
Marjah marketplace reopening marks economic progress ISAF JC: KABUL - The Marjah marketplace reopening Sept. 11 during a festival known as Mela marked ...
waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/.../marines-open-marjah-market.html
Major Afghanistan offensive 'launched in Marjah' - Helmand Blog ...
Feb 13, 2010 ... Helicopter-borne US marines and Afghan troops are attacking the Taliban-held town of Marjah in Nad Ali district in a bid to re-establish ...
helmandblog.blogspot.com/.../major-afghanistan-offensive-launched-in.html
Marines Host Stability Shuras in Marjah - War On Terror News
Oct 31, 2010 ... Marjah leaders rally locals for peace as US Marines see signs of stability in the region by Lance Cpl. Andrew Johnston RCT-1 MARJAH, ...
waronterrornews.typepad.com/.../marines-host-stability-shuras-in-marjah.html
TALIBAN PROPAGANDA WATCH (RC South) – 212145UTC Mar 10 « MILNEWS ...
Mar 21, 2010 ... Mujahideen inflict more deadly losses on U.S troops in Marjah ... 21 – A massive blast hit a U.S tank in Marjah's Qasabn area, on Sunday, ...
milnewsca.wordpress.com/2010/03/21/tpw-rc-south-212145utc-mar-10/
Marines Open Marjah Mosque - War On Terror News
Aug 22, 2010 ... Marines open renovated mosque for Afghans in Marjah Story by Lance Cpl. Andrew Johnston, Regimental Combat Team-7, 1st Marine Division ...
waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/.../marines-open-marjah-mosque.html
TALIBAN PROPAGANDA WATCH – 230030UTC Jul 10 « MILNEWS.ca Blog
Jul 22, 2010 ... At least US-UK terrorists were killed with their tank destroyed in an IED blast followed by Mujahideen attack in Marjah, Helmand on Thursday ...
milnewsca.wordpress.com/2010/07/22/tpw-230030utc-jul-10/
Marjah locals welcome Op #MOSHTARAK as a 'new dawn' - War On ...
A Military Operations news article 19 Feb 10 As Operation MOSHTARAK enters its second week, local people in Marjah have voiced their thanks to the ISAF ...
waronterrornews.typepad.com/.../marjah-locals-welcome-op-moshtarak-as-a-new-dawn.html
Helmand Blog - Afghanistan: Helmand Refugees Fleeing Ahead Of Anti ...
Feb 8, 2010 ... "People are leaving Marjah amid rumors that the [anti-Taliban] ... Haji Akhtar Mohammad, a resident of Marjah, tells Reuters that he ...
helmandblog.blogspot.com/.../helmand-refugees-fleeing-ahead-of-anti.html
Operation #Moshtarak Photos-Marjah, Helmand province, Afghanistan ...
Feb 18, 2010 ... A Marine with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, attempts to draw fire from a Taliban sniper who has Marines pinned down, ...
waronterrornews.typepad.com/.../operation-moshtarak-photosmarjah-helmand-province-afghanistan.html
Helmand Blog - Afghanistan: Q&A: Helmand's head of council for ...
Feb 18, 2010 ... No doubt there were problems in Nad Ali and Marjah - these areas were a ... If the police force was made up of local people I am sure Marjah ...
helmandblog.blogspot.com/.../q-helmands-head-of-council-for-tribal.html
Individually, these stories are just a small piece of the story. Together, they demonstrate the Marjah Campaign and how it is being won, from the initial advance, to meetings with the local leaders, to securing the marketplace, to renovating the mosque, to even the false claims by the enemy of destroying tanks at a time when there were no US Tanks in the whole of Afghanistan.
The big picture is made up of many small strokes. The battlefield is not won simply by occupation of the high ground. It is not as simple as historical conventional wars. This does not preclude the political leadership from defining Victory, but it seems that the last 6 years have left it to the Troops, through MilBlogs to tell the American People what is happening, how, and for what reason.
There is a lot of frustration within the military, more than I've seen since the mid-90's. Our Troops are willing to sacrifice and to risk to win, but the political leadership is pushing a peace-time mentality on Warriors in the Field, not least of which are forensics and "rights" that belong in Police Departments not on battlefields. Battlefield Commanders are forced to devote precious time to briefings re-inforcing things they cannot explain or honestly endorse and a new round of DADT repeal acceptance briefs is being developed to add to countless hours of suicide and PTSD briefs the Troops already loathe.
Yes, there is a need for a narrative about what it will take to win in Afghanistan, how we are doing it, and how our actions fit into the winning of Afghanistan, as well as how that all fits in to American National Security. Ole Blue at Afghan Quest can explain COIN better than anyone else on the web and War On Terror News has one of the best catalogs of the individual stories that make it up, but there is a gap between how re-introducing beekeepers to Afghanistan helps crops and teaching the strategies of COIN to whoever will listen.
Could I write that narrative? We have the evidence to do so, and I have the capacity to develop it, but only a certain amount of time. If I were to devote that time to the narrative rather than the evidence for it, who would provide the evidence I'd need? And who would be there to expand the readership to those that need and desire to understand? In the COIN strategy it takes a joint team focusing on the smallest details as well as the big picture to paint a forest full of trees of bark and veins on leaves.