Many ideas sound better in concept than in the way they are implemented. When Secretary of Defense Gates suggested that one way we could streamline the way we spend money on Defense by cutting the number of Generals we pay, there was little opposition. In many ways, cutting back a General or two, represents longer term savings and less detriment to readiness than cutting say F-22's and F-35's or Future Army Weapon Systems, which he also cut at the behest of the current POTUS.
Unfortunately, politics is omni-present in Washington DC, and Secretary Gates, like Secretary Panetta, are political appointees. The cuts are shell games in some respects and dangerous in others. According to the marketing, the DoD is cutting 103 Generals, but that doesn't represent the savings of 103 fewer Generals on the payroll. Many of these positions are simply being transferred into civilian positions, which means it will cost just as much, possibly more, to get the same job filled, but these new "Senior Executives" won't be deployable to combat.
The Generals that are actually being cut, aren't the logistics guys that fill seats in the Pentagon. The Army and Marines are being cut in far greater numbers and proportions than the Air Force and Navy and the cuts are coming from those positions fighting our wars, not the guys chatting it up with politicians in Washington. The Marines are losing 20% of their authorized Generals, while the Navy is increasing its portion of joint command positions, at the cost to the Army.
Overall, the Army is losing 33 Generals, 1/3rd of all the Generals cut. It is losing 10% of its force of Generals available to command forces in combat, and the civilian DoD leadership is cutting 47 General positions in combat. Those 50 new Senior Executive civilians won't be filling those roles.
Recently, I've noted that many joint commands, such as the European Command, Special Operations Command, and others were given to Navy Admirals. When Admiral Mullen was given the position as JCS, a Marine asked me my thoughts on a guy that had never been "in the trenches" running DoD while we had two ground wars in full swing. Its a rotating position and mostly admin/liaison I told him. Its far more important to have the groundpounder experience, as the on the ground Commander. But, because Admiral Mullen had never experienced life in the trenches, he supported DoD policies that undermined the ability of the groundpounder in Afghanistan in maintaining their capabilities and morale.
And these joint command positions have seen a huge shift: the Army lost 20% of those positions it had under Clinton.
Generals can't be appointed or trained overnight. It requires decades of experience, constant training, and continuing education. They make the big bucks, because they command Troops in life and death situations. As much as they do make, it is tiny in comparison to what civilians managing similar numbers of employees. And the repercussions of a decision by a General has far greater impact: it can cost lives and has lasting international repercussions.
Can a Colonel do the same job as a General? In many cases, yes. Can a civilian with a PhD from Harvard do it? NO. The civilian chose a life of ease that afforded him no experience in the life of danger. As bad as it may be that a General might try to command a battlefield through a satellite feed, he at least has the experience of having been in the field, attempting at a minimum, a training exercise of the same type as the ground commander is exercising in real life. College doesn't teach that and neither does corporate or bureaucratic life.
Of course, the Generals that remain will also have 49,000 fewer Troops to fight those wars. That's the equivalent of two divisions and would be equivalent to about 8-15 Generals, maybe.
Perhaps, it would have been more appropriate to cut those Generals (and the DoD civilians) that populate the Pentagon, than the combatant commanders that are fighting our wars.
Stumble It!
