As US politicians re-affirm their commitment to cutting the Military, to pulling out of Afghanistan, and returning to a "training mission," I think back to earlier years, of these wars, and to years prior, when the primary mission of the US Military was to fight other Armies. To hear it told in many circles, one might conclude that we haven't fought another Army since World War II, or for some that remember the Forgotten War, Korea. Though few attempt to outright deny we fought the Taliban government in 2001, the current arguments downplay or ignore that the War fought by 200 members of 5th Special Forces Group then was against the Taliban ran government of Mullah Omar, which is now the Taliban terrorist group, ran by Mullah Omar.
And few point out that while the War against the Taliban in Afghanistan was very much "made for Unconventional Warfare," i.e. Special Forces and other Special Operations Forces, the War in Iraq, against the Saddam Army was a classic Conventional War, involving Tank vs Tank Divisions. Those that fought those Wars, and trained for those types of Wars before then, are Senior NCO's and Officers now, or have ETS'd or Retired now. They are the very Soldiers most likely to be pushed out under the current purges, if they're still in. Many of today's Senior NCO's weren't in the pre-9/11 Military.
In 2001, most Americans didn't know who Al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden were. And many today still don't know who Ayman al-Zawahari or Mullah Omar are. Many have forgotten who Khalid Sheik Mohammed is and who al-Zaqawi was. People don't seem to want to know, or to remember that we went to war with The Taliban in 2001. It seems that OBL's strategy that rested on the short memories and low resolves is finally coming to fruition. Politically, this means that the Administration can push forward with insisting on releasing Taliban leaders and pushing for "peace negotiations" with them, while conforming to Taliban demands that International Forces retreat from Afghanistan, where the wars most violent three years have been 2009-2011.
I don't know what the priorities for training will be in the New Army and Marine Corps, after it is cut to a size that is no longer expected to win a War against an enemy Army, but those Troops need to learn the tactics of Brigade vs. Brigade Tank and Infantry battles, and given the size of the force requested, construction of Defensive positions. Fox Holes, or Individual Fighting Positions, and Battalion level defensive perimeters will be extremely important if the 2020 Army find themselves in a war with the North Koreans, Iranians, Pakistanis, or Chinese.
The course the current Administration has set does not allow for an Army that can defeat the enemy, but rather one that attempts to hold out, long enough for civilians to be trained as Soldiers and sent to their aid. The "strategy" recommended by the Administration relies on the Reserve Components to have an Active role, so the activated Reserves in such a War would already be stretched. It would still require weeks to get them to the battlefield, hoping the Reserves could help the Active Component maintain a stalemated defense, while the Military ramps up Basic Training operations.
The new generation of Troops will need to learn that they will likely be living in tents, or under ponchos, and will be lucky to have someone with a phone for an MWR call, once a week, in their unit.
Much of the new "strategy" rests on the expansion of Special Operations Forces(SOF). They're smaller, more lethal, and can be deployed "more quickly," than Conventional Forces from which they are recruited. SOF have special roles, but they're not a substitute for Tanks in a Conventional War. They are too expensive to be used as Common Infantry in a Conventional War.
To train a Conventional Soldier to a minimum of proficiency, i.e. to the point that he can learn to be a Soldier, requires no less than 10 weeks. In a rush, the 2020 Military would be expected to ward off an attack, for weeks while other Active Duty forces were sent to the battlefield, weeks more for the National Guard to be activated and arrive, and months for the wave of re-enforcements to be trained to be Privates, with enough of an NCO and Officer cadre surviving to lead the inexperienced force into battle. And this scenario assumes that the Military has stockpiled the tanks and equipment currently being taken out of service to fight a war in which it is likely outdated, rather than having to wait for the industrial base to ramp up production of that equipment, and then update it to the future needs.
While it took years for the Military equip the force with Armored HumVees and replace them with MRAP's, those vehicles would be useless against enemy tanks.
The post WWII peak of Military readiness occurred around 1990/1991. The buildup of the 80's was finally culminating in the defeat of the Soviet Union, and Reagan had put a premium on training for a War with the Soviets, while simultaneously maintaining a capability to fight their proxies in smaller wars like Grenada, El Salvador, and Grenada. At that time, the standard was that a Brigade of the 82nd Airborne could be deployed anywhere in the world, within 24 hours, and the Division in 72. It took 5 months to build up sufficient forces to take on Saddam's military in Desert Storm, and that force was of equal size to today's entire US Army, with some, but limited use of the Reserve forces in active combat.
The Reserve Forces in that war were activated primarily in a role of backfilling the Active Forces readiness requirements, and being ready to replace the heavy casualties expected in that war. While the War no doubt increased recruitment, those recruits, even if sent to the units already on the line, were not a required or determining factor in winning. The war was won, almost exclusively using the forces that were in uniform on the day Saddam invaded Kuwait.
The drawdown of the 90's saw 8 of the 18 Active Duty Divisions roll up their colors, and the Support Troops of the remainder grossly stripped of the remaining Divisions. In 1990, when you went to the Mess Hall (Dining Facility for current Troops), it was a Soldier that slopped your potatoes and beans on your trays. It was an NCO that oversaw the operation. When you needed your $300.00 worth of field gear, it was an NCO, a Supply Sergeant barking at you to keep your grubby little hands off of things you had not signed for. You knew who the high speed Grunts were, because they had the Load Bearing Vest, instead of the Load Bearing Equipment straps that dug into your shoulders when weighed down with two canteens of water and 7 magazines on a "Pistol Belt."
The 90's saw a transition from Military Cooks to Civilian Contractors in the Chow Hall. It saw a transition from Supply Sergeants to DoD Civilians in the Central Issuing Facility. It didn't cost less to hire civilians but it complied with the Administration's Request, and the Congressional Authorization for the number of Troops in uniform, while preserving the greatest number of Troops trained for combat. The current Administration is asking for an even smaller number of Troops in uniform and an even greater number of Civilians to do those things that Troops need to support Combat Operations. The Military is having to increase the number of Troops dedicated to managing contractors, as it decreases the number of Troops available to actually fight the enemy.
What effect did we experience in 2001 and 2003 and 2009, with the role of civilians supporting Troops, instead of Combat Support Troops supporting Combat Troops in war? We had to pay an exorbitant amount to convince Civilians to go to places like Baghdad and Bagram to feed Troops and drive supplies from Kuwait to Mosul, with Military Escort, since KBR would not allow their employees to even possess a handgun. In Desert Storm, Troops were lucky to have a laundry machine facility, but mostly they grabbed a bucket, and went to the Battalion PX, manned by the Retention NCO's to get a box of Tide to wash their own laundry in the same way that our ancestors did 150 years ago.
In the next war, Troops will likely be washing their own clothes in a bucket, again. They'll like be manning the burn buckets, burning their own human waste. That's the norm in a war. It's not likely the force will have locals bringing in vacuum trucks to clean the Port-a-Jons, and those containerized toilet and shower facilities will be low on the priority list, in comparison to war-fighting equipment and defensive position supplies. Beans and Bullets will be more important. And hopefully, the politicians will authorize stockpiling enough to last those months needed for re-inforcements to arrive.
But the lift capability to get supplies to those Troops will be stretched thin. The Administration is asking that the number of transport aircraft, and ships, be reduced, and that replacements to the current aircraft be cancelled, and those that have been used for decades be kept in service instead, repaired.
The Administration is betting on an expanded Intelligence operation being able to predict the next war, better than it has previous wars. But it has cancelled the new Global Hawk UAV, for the US Inventory, while buying it for NATO instead. The Administration is saying that our future defense can rely on the aid of allies to defend against an enemy it cannot accurately predict, as it puts its focus on Asia where we have few allies and the Middle East where we are retreating, even as we undermine and see fall the allies we once had. It is putting a premium on NATO, far from the areas it claims to be focused on, and an organization that has been cutting its Defense capabilities at a far more brisk pace than even the Administration.
This ignores even the most recent conflicts. The Libyan operation, which demonstrated a lack of regard for the Constitutional Requirement to receive Congressional approval for War, was touted as a NATO operation, but the NATO allies ran out of ammunition and couldn't target "the enemy" without US Assistance. This is the "defense strategy?!?!" To rely on allies that don't have the munitions to run an air operation for a few months?
I don't blame the NATO allies for rushing to the exit doors in Afghanistan, nor even for their (on average) token support in Afghanistan. Afghanistan may have been a classic case for the NATO treaty, but it was primarily an American War And when this Administration demonstrated a lack of resolve to win in a War that was started by the same enemy bloodying OUR nose, I cannot expect Our Allies to demonstrate greater resolve in fighting for us. WE were the ones attacked. If we're not willing to fight to win, I certainly don't expect others to put their necks on the line for us.
The French were one of the first to step up when McChrystal said he needed more Troops to win, but 2 years later, they're ready to call it quits. Many Frenchmen have given their lives, FIGHTING, in Afghanistan, but when they see the Administration insisting that ANA numbers being built beyond the speed with which they can be vetted, and seeing their own Soldiers killed as a result, in what the Administration refuses to admit is enemy combat, I can't blaming them for saying they're going to take their ball and go home.
The situation is analogous to a barfight. It was the US that got in the barfight, with a gang of thugs including the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Our Friends stood up. The Brits, the Germans, the Spaniards, the Romanians, the Czechs, the Aussies, Canucks, and Kiwis and more all stood up, and said, "You wanna fight the Americans, you fight us all." They fought beside us well. But if this Administration insists on sitting down and watching the fight, instead of leading it, they have no responsibility to fight it for us.
And the next time? Well the next time, Our Friends will remember that we decided to sit down instead of winning. If they don't want to pay for their own Defense, we have no obligation to supplement it for them (i.e. giving away expensive equipment to allies that we won't even buy for our own Troops), but neither do they have an obligation to stand up for us, if we're going to sit down in the middle of a fight.
The next generation of Troops will need to learn to fight with less, and expect re-inforcements to arrive later to defend longer against an enemy we probably won't expect, even with an increased intelligence apparatus, but it is a mistake to make the newest intelligence field, Cyber Warfare, primarily a Military effort. The internet evolves at too rapid a pace for the Military to take the lead, and frankly, Cyber Warriors have little need to have weapons and marching training. The civilian side of the National Security Agency would be far more nimble and appropriate for it.
Those fighting the Cyber battles of the future, i.e. attacks, espionage, and theft on the internet don't need to be on actual battlefields. Those best suited for it, are the youth, particularly those that have no desire to put on a 55 pound ruck, 30 pounds of body armor, and sleep under a poncho while patrolling for days in search of an enemy to shoot.
The Army of 2020, as requested by the Obama Administration will be little more than a tripwire, not a fighting force designed to win wars. They say we plan to fight the next war based on the last war we fought, and this Administration refuses to use the word Victory in the current wars, as it insists on retreat, without Victory, so evidently, the next war won't be fought with Victory as a goal either, but rather with the goal of a standstill.
The Wars of the 22nd Century have not been two or three single wars, but rather two or three consecutive wars in the same two or three Countries. The Invasion of Iraq was a different war than the War against Al-Qaeda and the War against the Mehdi Militia in Iraq. Those wars were different wars than the War against Iranian backed Special Groups. The Invasion of Afghanistan was a different war than the war against a resurgent Taliban and the war against the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan fought by the Germans in the North of Afghanistan. And then there are the Drone Wars into Pakistan and fought in Libya. And finally, the last years of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been or will be Wars of Retreat, the logistical nightmare of finding, identifying, and recovering years of equipment buildup to fight those wars.
Stumble It!
